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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
certified mail will be delivered to the addressee. As with any method of
substituted service, cases will arise in which the issue will be whether the
defendant has received actual notice. The proposed mailing provision
recognizes the possibility of non-delivery and provides for it by allowing
the defendant to invoke section 317 if he meets the requisite require-
ments.53
Since the proposed mailing procedure is arguably constitutional, the
primary issue is whether it would achieve the desired goals of service as
well as, or better than, the new CPLR section 308(2). Certainly such a pro-
cedure would help reduce the incidence of "sewer service" since it eli-
minates the necessity of personally serving the defendant. At the same time
it eliminates the cost of hiring a process server; the recently adopted CPLR
section 308(2) does not. Furthermore, a return receipt is more reliable
proof of service than an affidavit from the process server. Unlike return
receipts, affidavits are highly susceptible to attack. The use of return receipts
would tend to reduce the frequency of affidavit battles between the parties.
It was just this abuse that the new CPLR section 308 (2) hoped to curtail.54
The 193rd session of the New York State Legislature enacted a major
change in the service of process procedures. The new section 308(2) may
reduce difficulties which arose under the former in-hand service provision;
it does not, however, tend to solve the problems of excessive cost and
affidavit abuse. A close watch should be kept on the operation of the new
California provision and, at the same time, attention should be directed
toward the practical workings of the new CPLR section. If old problems
remain, the Legislature should give serious consideration to a procedure
allowing mailed service of process in the first instance.
JOHN C. SPITZMILLER
LEGISLATION - CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF
THE NEW YORK FAMILY CoupT ACT
Recently the New York Legislature has taken a fresh approach to a
most shocking and tragic problem: child abuse and neglect. The New York
Family Court Act, enacted in 1962, contemplated the problem of child
neglect through specific legislation,' but made no separate provisions for
the handling of child abuse. Consequently, throughout the statute's early
53. N.Y. Cv. PRAc. LAw § 317 (McKinney Supp. 1969). This provision allows the
defendant to reopen a judgment and defend the action if the court finds that he did
not receive notice and has %, meritorious defense.
54. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
1. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr art. 3 (McKinney 1963) (repealed 1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1963 Aar].
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years, situations of abuse were petitioned to the court under the guise of
neglect.2 In 1969, a separate and distinct child abuse article was added to
the original legislation.3 Almost immediately the New York City Bar As-
sociation recommended its repeal. The Association stated that the legis-
lation not only added little to the Family Court's power to protect chil-
dren from abusing parents, a feat already being accomplished under Article
3, but created problems in the areas of constitutional law and judicial ad-
ministration. 4 Revised Article 10 of the Family Court Act, "Child Protec-
tive Proceedings,"5 the subject of this note, is a consolidation and revision
of all previous legislation pertaining to child abuse and neglect.
Child Abuse and the Use of Drugs
Section 1046 (a) (iii) of Article 106 provides that proof of a person's
repeated use of drugs shall be prima facie evidence that such a person's
child is neglected. Previously, an adjudication of narcotic drug addiction
constituted a presumption that such a person's child was abused.7 The man.
dated dispositional result of the presumption of abuse was removal of the
child from his home.8 This presumption of abuse and the consequential
removal presented a constitutional issue of violation of due process. If the
former law were strictly followed, mandatory removal could be enforced
against a parent who had been adjudicated a narcotic addict, but who later
had been found, by the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, to have
been rehabilitated. 9 Moreover, proof that one parent was addicted would
be sufficient cause for a finding of abuse and removal, even though the other
parent was capable of providing for the child. The new legislation has
lessened the chance of creating such a constitutional issue by eliminating
2. The child neglect article has been construed as encompassing physical abuse.
See, e.g., In re S, 46 Misc. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Faro. Ct. 1965).
3. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACr art. 10 (McKinney 1969) (repealed 1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 Aar].
4. See Committee Report, The Enactment of The Abused Child Law and Com-
mittee Findings As To Defects in The Law, 24 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 347, 348 (1969):
The Committee upon its study of the law finds it bad because it suffers from
numerous defects in draftmanship, because parts of it raise constitutional prob-
lems, because it unduly interferes with the judiciary by imposing through
statutory mandate a special part of the Family Court, because without providing
the necessary additional funds it imposes burdens on the Family Court and its
staff, on the police commissioner of the city of New York and on the district
attorneys outside of the city of New York, because of its interjection of the
police and the district attorneys into what should be civil proceedings in a
civil court, and because of its unwise repudiation of the use of law guardians
to represent children.
5. N.Y. FAmILY Cr. AcT art. 10 (McKinney 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 AcT].
6. 1970 Am' § 1046 (a) (iii).
7. 1969 AC § 1012.
8. Id. § 1022.
9. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 208 (4) (b) (McKinney 1970).
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mandatory removal. In a situation involving drug use by parents, the court
now has the same dispositional options as in any other neglect case.' 0
Nevertheless the practical effect of the statutory change is dubious.
Since a judge still sits as fact-finder in these proceedings, the change may be
more in form than substance. Under the presumption rule, if the addicted
parent offered no rebuttal evidence that the child was not abused, the
judge was obligated to make a determination of abuse. Now, under the
prima facie evidence rule, the parent has the option of offering rebuttal
evidence and the judge's determination is limited to a finding of neglect.
Since the nature of the rebuttal evidence will be of non-neglect rather than
non-addiction, it is both possible if not probable that a judge, considering
the over-all judicial treatment of drug use today, may make a determina-
tion of neglect notwithstanding the sufficiency of rebuttal evidence intro-
duced. In this regard the change might be more significant if a jury acted
as fact-finder.
A Relaxation of the Evidentiary Requirements
Under previous legislation, material and relevant evidence was admis-
sible in a dispositional hearing, and competent, material and relevant evi-
dence was admissible in a fact-finding hearing." Requirements for the
admissibility of evidence under the new Article 10 have been relaxed, re-
sulting in the abrogation of some traditional rules of evidence. For example,
proof of abuse of one child is now admissible in a hearing held to deter-
mine abuse of another child of the same parent-respondent. 12 Moreover,
prior statements of a child, relating to abuse or neglect, are now expressly
admissible.' 3 Under the previous statute there would be some question as
to the materiality and relevance of these statements. It should be noted,
however, that such statements, if uncorroborated, are not alone sufficient
to warrant a fact-finding of abuse or neglect.' 4
In defense of the relaxed evidentiary provisions it is submitted that
the Family Court is an unusual part of the judiciary. It is simply what its
name implies: a court for the settlement of familial problems. Hence, com-
mon sense should dictate who ought to be protected and how this protec-
tion should be accomplished. The goal of child protection is unique; it
entails considering the welfare of the child while simultaneously consider-
ing the rights of the parent. Thus, to justify the relaxation of rules of
evidence it must be determined that the need for information outweighs
10. 1970 AcT § 1052.
11. 1969 AcT § 346.
12. 1970 Aar § 1046(a) (i).
13. Id. § 1046(a) (vi).
14. td.
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certain parental rights. In the area of child protection the legislature has
undoubtedly made such a determination.
Definitional Considerations
Another change effectuated by the new legislation is a redefinition of
the terms "neglected"'15 and "abused"'10 child. The repealed Article 3 de-
fined "neglected child" as one whose parent failed to provide adequate
physical care and a level of guardianship and moral care which would
protect a child from serious harm.' 7 Presently a "neglected child" is one
whose parent does not exercise proper supervision or guardianship by un-
reasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted upon the child substantial
harm.'8 Article 10 previously defined "abused child" as one who had had
serious mental or physical injury inflicted upon him19 by other than acci-
dental means or whose parent or custodian had been adjudicated a narcotic
addict.20 Now an "abused child" is one whose parent inflicts or allows to be
inflicted upon the child non-accidental physical injury or creates or allows
to be created substantial risk thereof.2'
The present distinction between abused and neglected children ap-
pears to be unnecessary. Before the promulgation of the instant legislation
the dichotomy served a purpose: since removal of the child was mandatory
upon a finding of abuse, abused children were theoretically handled one
way22 and neglected children another.23 Today, however, the judge has the
same dispositional options for both classifications.2 4 Consequently, the
dichotomy adds nothing to the child protection goal of the legislation. It
is submitted that the legislature should re-examine its reasons for retaining
two classifications, and, perhaps, consolidate the dual categorization into
a "harmed child" classification.
The Role of the District Attorney
The role of the district attorney has been altered so that in all abuse
cases he is now a "necessary party to the proceedings." 25 Formerly, he repre-
sented the child in all stages of the proceedings, 26 a designation which is
15. 1970 Acr § 1012 (f.
16. Id. § 1012 (e).
17. 1963 ACr § 312.
18. 1970 Acr§ 101 2 (f).
19. To compound the criticism of the 1969 Act, this draftmanship can be said to
leave open the possibility that a child could be abused by one other than his parent or
guardian.
20. 1969 Aar § 1012.
21. 1970 Acr§ 1012 (e).
22. 1969 Acr § 1022. Although the dichotomy did not materialize due to the short
life of this section, it is reasonable to assume the inevitability of such a result.
23. 1963 ACr § 352.
24. 1970 AcT § 1052.
25. Id. § 254 (b).
26. 1969 Aar § 1016.
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not synonymous with "necessary party." While under prior law the district
attorney could originate proceedings, he is now further empowered by
express authorization to subpoena evidence or records relating to abuse
or neglect,2 7 to make a motion for adjournment in a fact-finding or dis-
positional hearing,28 and to make a motion for staying, modifying, setting
aside or vacating orders.29 While the legislation specifies what the district
attorney can do, it does not effectively clarify the concept of being a "neces-
sary party." A possible interpretation is that the district attorney is the
prosecutor with the subject child being the state's complainant, but if this
is so, how do we explain the child's being represented by a law guardian °
who is other than the district attorney? Yet, one should not have to engage
in conjecture in order to understand the statute. It is submitted that the
legislature should examine the underlying reasons for including a district
attorney in a Family Court proceeding and clarify his role, if, in fact, his
presence is warranted.
Examination of Parents Reconsidered
Previous abuse legislation provided that a parent who was accused of
abusing his child might be subjected to a mental examination simply on
the basis of the allegation.m 3 The new article has abolished this practice.
This innovation eliminates an area which could have developed constitu-
tional questions involving the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment. While the Family Court is directly proscribed from ordering
mental examinations, it still has the indirect power to order them. If the
court believes that a parent of an abused child is mentally deficient, it may
transfer the proceeding to a criminal courtI which may order the examina-
tion.33
27. 1970 Aar § 1038.
28. Id. § 1048(a).
29. Id. § 1061.
30. Id. § 242.
31. 1969 Acr § 1021.
32. 1970 Acr § 1014.
33. N.Y. CODE GCRim. PRoc. § 658 (McKinney 1958):
If at any time before final judgment it shall appear to the court having jurisdic-
tion of the person of a defendant indicted for a felony or a misdemeanor that
there is a reasonable ground for believing that such defendant is in such [a]
state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the
charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his defense, or if the defendant
makes a plea of insanity to the indictment, instead of proceeding with the
trial, the court, upon its own motion, or that of the district attorney or the
defendant, may in its discretion order such defendant to be examined to deter-
mine the question of his sanity. .
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Conclusion
The relaxed evidentiary provisions help to solve one of the primary
problems found in abuse cases. Previously, in the absence of a reliable
admission by a parent as to his or her guilt, it was virtually impossible to
establish proof of abuse to a reasonable degree of certainty8 4 Abuse can
now be shown by admitting into evidence previously excluded informa-
tion.
The definitions have been set forth in such a manner that they increase
the circumstances in which the Family Court may intervene to aid chil-
dren. Practically speaking, intervention by the Family Court is now possible
in situations of potential harm as well as actual harm. Moreover, the elimi-
nation of mandatory removal and mental examinations and the recon-
sideration of the drug use-child abuse dilemma have erased many of the
constitutional questions raised by previous legislation.
PETrR P. INSERO, JR.
34. See Dembitz, Child Abuse and the Law-Fact and Fiction, 24 RrcoRW oF
N.Y.C.B.A. 613 (1969).
